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 WHAT’S RELIGION GOT TO DO WITH IT?1  VIRTUALLY NOTHING: HOSANNA-TABOR 
AND THE UNBRIDLED POWER OF THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION 
MARSHA B. FREEMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled against a high school teacher who had 
claimed discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after being fired from 
her lay position at a church-run high school.2  While the case ostensibly revolved around her 
claim for reasonable accommodation for a medical condition,3 the decision was based not on 
whether such an accommodation was both available and reasonable under the Act, but on whether 
the school had to provide one even if it were, holding that the Act exempted the school from such 
requirements merely because of its religious status.4 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 expanded the protections already available 
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.5  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act banned discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability by the federal government, federal contractors, and any organization 
receiving federal financial assistance.6  The ADA covers not only these entities, but all state and 
local governments and even private businesses and employers that meet the definition of a “public 
accommodation,” such as theaters, hotels, restaurants, hospitals and medical offices, office build-
ings, and similar arenas.7 
The ADA is considered one of the most important pieces of civil rights legislation to 
have been enacted by the nation, following in the footsteps of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 
1964.8  President George H. W. Bush signed the legislation into law on July 26, 1990, saying 
                                                                
1 With reference to TINA TURNER, WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT (Capitol Records 1984). 
*    Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law.  I would like to thank my research assistant, Jacqueline Rice, for 
her tremendous research help in preparing this article. 
2 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
3 The teacher in question has a condition known as narcolepsy, which can cause her to fall asleep in front of 
a class.  Medication, however, controls the condition.  The school argued it did not have to accommodate her even on 
medication, as it was a religious institution and therefore exempt under the ministerial exemption to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-1(a).  The counterargument of this article is that the ministerial exemption was intended to apply only to those in an 
actual ministerial position, not to the institution itself regarding virtually anyone it employs. 
4 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 714. 
5 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
6 See id. 
7 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006). The Act provides exemptions to the requirement to refit buildings in many 
instances. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.404–.405 (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (1997). 
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA Basics: Statutes and 
Regulations, in ADA BEST PRACTICES TOOL KIT FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, Ch. 1 at 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.ada.gov/pcatoolkit/chap1toolkit.pdf. 
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“[l]et the shameful wall of exclusion finally come tumbling down.”9  These words were likely not 
haphazardly uttered, nor should they be casually referenced.  The basic tenets of the ADA are that 
it applies to anyone who has a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities, has a record of having such, or is regarded as having such,10 and that any per-
son who meets any of these requirements may not be discriminated against through exclusion or 
denial of benefits or services by any covered entity.11 
Unless, of course, they work for a religious institution.  Religious entities have been 
granted exemptions under the ADA.  Specifically, the Act exempts all activities of the religious 
organization, even if they are secular in nature.12  Religious entities may give preference in hiring 
to religious followers and may even require applicants or employees to adhere to the institution’s 
specific religious doctrines.13  Religious entities, however, are not exempt from the employment 
requirements of the Act if they meet the same prerequisites as other employers, i.e. having a cer-
tain number of people working for the organization.14  The Act also provides that religious entities 
are subject to the prohibition against retaliation against an employee who brings or threatens to 
bring a claim under the Act.15  The latter in particular is important in Hosanna-Tabor, where the 
teacher was fired after threatening to sue under the Act.16 
The reasons for the ministerial exemption to the ADA are most logical when examined 
in light of the long-standing prohibition against government entanglement with religion under the 
First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.17  Under such restraints in general, 
the government cannot require a religious institution to hire a pastoral leader of another faith or 
force an entity such as the Catholic Church, with its adherence to male-only priests, to hire a fe-
male in that role.18  When applied in a similar manner, the ministerial exemption is both appropri-
ately protective and a common-sense treatment of the law.  The courts have applied the exemption 
as an interpretive tool, used to ensure that a statute’s application will not offend the constitutional 
principles of separation of church and state.19  Courts have, however, historically and appropriate-
ly distinguished between a religious entity’s religious and secular, or lay, employees, finding that 
applying antidiscrimination laws to secular employees does not run the risk of entanglement or 
Free Exercise issues.20 
                                                                
9 ADA Basics: Statutes and Regulations, supra note 8 (citing to speech by President Bush at the signing of 
the Act). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C) (2006). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). 
12 ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, III-1.5000-1.5200 (1993), available at http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html. 
13 See Brad Turner, Comment, It’s My Church and I Can Retaliate If I Want to: Hosanna-Tabor and the Fu-
ture of the Ministerial Exception, 7 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 21, 25 (2011). 
14 See ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 12, III-1.5000. 
15 Turner, supra note 13. 
16 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 700 (2012). 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
18 Turner, supra note 13. 
19 See id. at 26. 
20 See Soriano v. Xavier Univ. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1188, 1189 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding that a suit for age 
discrimination did not raise concerns about entanglement or Free Exercise issues); Turner, supra note 13, at 26 & n.46. 
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In a case such as Hosanna-Tabor, the immediate question then becomes: how does the 
court see the plaintiff—as a religious or secular employee?  Generally, courts will look to the du-
ties and responsibilities of the employee to determine where he/she falls.21  Often referred to as a 
facially reasonable “primary duties” test regarding what specific, religious-based responsibilities 
the employee may have, this test has unfortunately evolved over time into a question of whether 
the employee’s position is “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.”22  This 
evolution, while sounding semantic in nature, can result in theoretically far narrower holdings 
than if the question truly rested on the employee’s actual “primary duties.”  It can also lead to the 
two main concerns evinced in the litany of cases leading up to Hosanna-Tabor that the court will 
violate the church’s freedom of expression under the First Amendment if it questions the entity’s 
determination as to what and who is “important” to the religious and pastoral mission of an insti-
tution,23 and that the court will appear to second-guess a religious institution’s proffer of a reli-
gious, rather than secular, reason for the apparent discrimination, thereby entangling it under the 
Establishment Clause.24 
The courts have allowed what was created as a seemingly narrow exception geared to 
protecting an institution’s religious freedom to be broadened considerably.  Today this exception 
is used to rebuff plaintiffs on issues that have little if any bearing to religion or religious freedom.  
Part II of this article will examine the myriad ways the courts have interpreted the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine25 to apply the religious exemption to non-discrimination statutes, including the 
ADA, on issues having virtually no relation to an institution’s religious goals.  This allows reli-
gious institutions to protect themselves from liability and, more importantly, to openly discrimi-
nate based on their own whims rather than constitutional necessity.  Part III will seek a better res-
olution for those cases revolving around non-religious issues, even when involving a ministerial 
employee.  It will recommend a narrower interpretation of the rule to effectuate fairness to both 
the institutions and their employees. 
I. MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW 
Far from being merely another piece of legislation in the course of business, the ADA 
took on far greater importance.  It was seen as the logical continuum of the progress made with 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,26 which prohibited discrimination based on race, color, and national 
                                                                
21 Turner, supra note 13, at 27 & n.48 
22 Id.  See also Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1777 (2008) [hereinafter The Ministerial Exception to Title VII] (arguing that “the First 
Amendment provisions that motivate the existence of the ministerial exception should also guide its application”). 
23 Compare Turner, supra note 13, at 27 & n.54 (citing to Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 
1036, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying the ministerial exception to uphold the dismissal of an age-discrimination suit 
brought by a choir director)), with EEOC v. Mississippi Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980), and EEOC v. Fremont 
Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986) (both holding that teachers in a religious school are not necessarily 
ministers even if the school regards them as such). 
24 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-22 (1971). 
25 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (construing broad meaning to federal statutes 
to avoid conflict with the Constitution). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994). 
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origin,27 and was later amended to prohibit discrimination based on gender.28  The language of the 
ADA cites to the Court’s exact prior language in describing the historical plight of racial minori-
ties,29 highlighting the tremendous importance Congress placed on this expansion of civil rights to 
people with disabilities.30  The Act was described as the “next giant step” in American civil 
rights.31  It was promulgated with the intent that disabled citizens would become the “master of 
their own fates.”32  The Act was, in the words of one congressman, intentionally fashioned to give 
protections against discrimination for disabilities in a manner mimicking the existing civil rights 
statutes.33  Very importantly, the Act was designed to cover the same range of protections in em-
ployment, transportation and accommodation as those included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.34 
One cannot realistically examine the religious exemption to the ADA without similar 
analysis of such exemptions to the Civil Rights Act and other non-discrimination Acts.  All such 
Acts have the purpose of giving legal protection to persons based on specific attributes, and all 
have carved out specific and narrow exceptions to the requirements of such protections.  Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.35  A narrow exception was carved out by Congress, allowing religious organizations 
to hire based on faith (eliminating the hypothetical problem of the non-Catholic priest, etc.), but 
still allowed for discrimination claims based on race, sex or national origin.36  Religious entities 
argued such cases still allowed the courts to be impermissibly involved in church decisions, lead-
ing to the first major common law religious exception to the Act.37  In that case, the Fifth Circuit 
found that claimant, a female minister in the Salvation Army, was not entitled to employment dis-
crimination protections based on sex under the Act, holding that religious entities were entitled to 
act in their church’s best interest without interference from the state.38 
                                                                
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994); See also Arlene B. Mayerson & Silvia Yee, The ADA and Models of Equality, 
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 535, 536 (2001) (“[T]he 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, col-
or, and national origin.”). 
28 See Mayerson & Yee, supra note 27, at 536; Education Amendments of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(1994). 
29 See Mayerson & Yee, supra note 27, at 536 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101(7) (1994) and United States v. Car-
olene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (finding that “discrete and insular minorities” may not be properly protect-
ed by the political processes relied on by the citizenry)). 
30 See Mayerson & Yee, supra note 27, at 536. 
31 To Establish A Clear and Comprehensive Prohibition of Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap: Joint 
Hearing on S. 2345 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res. and the Sub-
comm. on Select Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 4 (1988) [hereinafter Prohibition of Discrimina-
tion on the Basis of Handicap] (statement of Hon. Major R. Owens, Rep. from N.Y.). 
32 Id. at 5. 
33 Id. at 13 (statement of Tony Coelho, Rep. from Cal.). 
34 See id. at 16. 
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000) (applying statute to all employers with at least 15 employees, in-
cluding religious entities), cited in Todd Cole, The Ministerial Exception: Resolving the Conflict Between Title VII and the 
First Amendment, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 703, 705-6 & n.11 (2010). 
36 See Todd Cole, The Ministerial Exception: Resolving the Conflict Between Title VII and the First 
Amendment, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 703, 705-6 & n.11 (2010). 
37 Id. at 706-07 (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
38 Id. 
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This original court exception, dealing not with the religious direction of the church al-
ready carved out by Congress (the hypothetical female Catholic priest), but rather specifically 
granting a religious entity immunity from liability for discrimination on other grounds, led inevi-
tably to bigger and broader exclusions.39 
While logic dictates that a religious organization should not be required to hire a cler-
gyperson of a different faith, the courts have swung far wider in allowing religious entities to dis-
criminate based on virtually any reason, and today, under the most tenuous ties to religion.  Lead-
ing up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor, every circuit except the Federal had 
adopted the religious exception in some form or other.40  Most held that it applied not only to or-
dained clergy of the institution, but to any employee whose “primary duties consist of teaching, 
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or partici-
pation in religious ritual and worship.”41  This has come to be accepted as the “primary duties” 
test, used at least theoretically to determine if the employee is acting mainly in furtherance of the 
organization’s religious agenda,42 and again can be seen as a not necessarily fair (to those affected 
by the alleged discrimination) but a somewhat logical extension of the original narrow exception.  
Under an actual primary duties test, McClure would make sense even when allowing for discrim-
ination based on sex, assuming the employee’s sex had some tangible impact on his or her work.  
The Fifth Circuit, however, held that it was the church’s view of why or how the employee’s sex 
impacted her work, and not the state’s, that mattered; in actuality all the Court decided was that 
the church had the right to determine how any employee can be treated as long as the person has 
at least a relation to the church’s doctrine.43 
The problem, however, is that what was touted as a supposedly narrow “primary duties” 
test has undergone huge expansion.  Today, courts interpret a primary duties test as whether the 
employee’s responsibilities are “important” to the organization’s goals.44  While theoretically pay-
ing deference to the Free Exercise Clause, it hypothetically allows for religious entities to dis-
criminate unfettered; even the janitor who prepares the sanctuary and cleans up after Mass could 
be found to be “important” to the church’s ability to disseminate its message.  While this is hope-
fully an exaggeration,45 it is the problem courts have in trying to fit a seemingly narrow exception 
such as a “primary duty” of the employee into a far broader-based application of the organiza-
tion’s main goals.  Some favor this broad interpretation, even acknowledging it may have the ef-
fect of harm to the individual in areas not related to the church’s religious goals: Laycock ex-
pounds that it is the church’s right to autonomy, not the employee’s right to be free of 
                                                                
39 See Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); Bogan v. 
Miss. Conference of The United Methodist Church, 433 F. Supp. 2d 762, 765-66 (S.D. Miss. 2006). 
40 Cole, supra note 36, at 707. 
41 Id. (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
42 Id. 
43 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972). 
44 See Ministerial Exception to Title VII, supra note 22, at 1776. 
45 Perhaps not so much of one.  The test has been held to apply to music teachers and even the church organ-
ist.  See generally Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F. 3d 1036, 1037, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding the duties 
of the church organist to have a “significant religious dimension”); Starkman v. Evans 198 F.3d 173, 173-75, 177 (5th Cir. 
1999) (determining a choirmaster to be a “spiritual leader” for purposes of the ministerial exception). 
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discrimination, that matters, no matter the issue.46  Laycock argues that churches have the right to 
manage themselves, free of government intrusion.  While he acknowledges the right of govern-
ment interference for reasons of compelling state interests, he apparently does not include protec-
tion from employment discrimination in that description, but rather believes that as a general rule, 
most state interests designed to protect workers will be “illegitimate.”47 
The concerns of scholars such as Laycock for the potential infringement on church mat-
ters is echoed in the court decisions that tend to err on the side of caution, despite potential harm 
to the employee, rather than risk even the hypothetical infringement into a church’s religious role.  
Some argue the very inquiry by a court into how an employee’s role fits into the church’s dogma 
is in itself an entanglement with religion.48 
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) also has specific religious exemptions, limited to the ability 
of a religious entity to limit the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings not used for commercial 
purposes to those of a particular faith.  The exemption itself is constrained by the caveat that 
membership in the religion is not restricted on account of race, color or national origin.49  Look-
ing at the words of the FHA, it seems clear the congressional intent was to allow freedom of ex-
pression in private dwellings, while requiring adherence to non-discrimination tenets in commer-
cial properties.  This comports with other sections of the Act, where private property owners may 
restrict occupants residing within the owner’s personal dwelling, but not if they are renting or sell-
ing as a professional landlord.50  Like the application of the religious exception to the Civil Rights 
Act, courts examining discrimination claims under the FHA are equally reluctant to limit the 
rights of religious organizations, often relying on (possibly spurious) findings that the organiza-
tions’ endeavors do not fit under the Act at all.51 
II. DEFINING, OR DIVINING, PURPOSE 
While the religious exemption to the ADA seems fairly straightforward, its application 
has been anything but.  While the Constitution does proscribe government interference with reli-
gion, compelling state interests can and do sometimes triumph over these constraints.52  Although 
Congress promulgated the ADA as a major complement to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,53 courts 
                                                                
46 See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor 
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373-74 (1981). 
47 Id. at 1374. 
48 See Dunlap infra note 80, at 1776-77. 
49 See Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
50 See Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3604.  But see Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 
945, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that non-profit organization running a homeless shelter restricted to males and in-
cluding religious indoctrination did not violate the FHA); Intermountain Fair Hous. Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Min-
istries, 717 F.Supp. 2d 1101, 1112 (D. Idaho 2010) (holding that homeless shelter which included alcohol treatment pro-
gram was not a “dwelling” under the FHA and therefore there was no violation).  The holdings of these cases seem to turn 
on the determination that the non-profits running the shelters were not using them for “commercial” enterprises. 
51 Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3604. 
52 See Laycock, supra note 46, at 1374. 
53 See Prohibition of Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap, supra note 31, at 9 (statement of Sen. Tom 
Harkin, Co-Chairman, S. Comm. on the Handicapped) (“Almost a quarter century after the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, [the Americans with Disabilities Act] is long overdue.”). 
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have consistently been reluctant to apply the non-discrimination policies of any of the major Acts 
to religious entities, apparently finding that almost nothing in them is constitutionally compelling 
enough to justify holding religious institutions to the same standards as the rest of society. 
The problem with this court-driven analysis is that it disregards Congress’s intent to pro-
tect citizens from the abuses of employers, one of the basic tenets of all of the non-discrimination 
Acts, including the ADA.  By treating religious employers as a totally separate class, the courts 
have carved out an almost foolproof exception, allowing hypothetically for almost any scenario of 
discrimination to occur without remedy in religious employment settings. 
Although the courts have maintained that they look to an employee’s “primary duties,” 
those duties have been whittled down to whether the employee serves an “important” religious 
interest of the employer.54  But when it comes to deciding what may be important to a religious 
organization, the courts have been reluctant to second-guess the religious employer on virtually 
any issue.  While the courts have notionally limited the churches’ immunized acts to those involv-
ing “ministers,” this already weak defining line has been blurred considerably by Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.55 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court held that a parochial school teacher could not sue 
her employer under the ADA, even though her duties were primarily the same as those of lay em-
ployees.56  Cheryl Perich was hired on contract to teach a range of academic subjects and spend a 
short period four days a week on religious issues.57  She was eventually granted “called teacher” 
status, allowing her more job protections and the title of “commissioned minister,” although her 
duties remained the same.58  After an extensive medical leave, the school board expressed doubts 
about her ability to perform her teaching duties, and, although her doctor affirmed her capabili-
ties, pushed her to resign.  When she refused, the board found her insubordinate, in large part be-
cause of her threat to take legal action if they followed through on a warning to rescind her 
“called,” or protected, status.59 
The ADA, under which Perich sought protection, forbids retaliation by employers for 
threats of legal action.60  Hosanna-Tabor successfully argued that it was immune from suit under 
this clause based on Perich’s role, presumably as a “called teacher” and “commissioned minis-
ter.”61  In a nod to the fox guarding the hen house, the Court relied entirely on the school’s view 
as to whether and why an employee is a “called teacher.” 
There are those who argue that religious entities should be virtually immune from gov-
ernment “intrusion” into even their decision-making on how they determine an employee’s “im-
                                                                
54 Laycock, supra note 46, at 1374. 
55 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
56 Id. at 708. 
57 Id. at 700; see also Turner, supra note 13, at 22. 
58 Turner, supra note 13, at 22. 
59 Id. at 23–24. 
60 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (“No person shall discriminate against any 
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individ-
ual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
chapter.”). 
61 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 708-09 (2012). 
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portance” to their cause.62  There is an obvious fallacy to this argument.  If the courts cannot in-
quire into how and why an employee is determined to be a “minister” for work purposes, espe-
cially when the bulk of their duties are non-ministerial, or as to how the institution determines 
his/her “importance” to its goals, the courts are not making informed decisions, but merely deci-
sions based on an almost absolute adherence to the exception as defined by the institutional de-
fendant.  Even when applied to an obvious and legitimate “minister,” the exception is fraught with 
problems.  To use a hopefully ludicrous example, what of a wheelchair-bound pastor who is de-
nied employment apparently on the basis of his/her physical disability?  Under such a theory, a 
church would need to do no more than assert its belief that the pastor, concededly important to the 
religious goals of the organization, would not be able to be effective as a religious leader; a court 
would not inquire why not nor ask how it arrived at such a conclusion.  In distinct contrast, any 
secular employer would be required to prove a non-discriminatory reason for the non-hire in such 
a situation.  Under the current application of the exemption, the religious employer cannot be 
probed either as to its designation of possibly questionable ministerial duties on an employee, nor 
as to the availability or validity of a non-discriminatory defense. 
In essence, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found in McClure that the Salvation Army 
could sexually discriminate against its female minister simply because they alleged a need to do 
so based on its religious requirements; the court held it could not actually challenge the appropri-
ateness or even the validity of those requirements for fear of infringing on the church’s autonomy 
and/or entangling the government in the church’s private business.63 
When applying the non-discrimination policies to religious organizations, courts have 
given broad and consistent leeway to the defendants.  Starting with the Fifth Circuit in McClure, 
courts have clearly chosen to err on the side of almost virtual church autonomy and far away from 
even a hint of government “entanglement.”64  By the time Hosanna-Tabor reached the Supreme 
Court, most circuits had affirmed the right of religious institutions to be free from “interference” 
in their employment decisions, regardless of how tenuous a relation the employee or the discrimi-
nation had to the religious goals of the institution.65  Proponents argue, and the courts appear to 
agree, especially since Hosanna-Tabor, that the Free Exercise Clause does not merely protect re-
ligious organizations from state intrusion into their clergy employment practices, but totally 
screens them against all inquiries relating to them.66 
As noted, this almost blanket protection from state questions regarding religious em-
ployment practices is theoretically limited to clergy, or those in “ministerial” positions.  In reality, 
that line has also been totally blurred, if not before then certainly by Hosanna-Tabor.  The teacher 
in Hosanna-Tabor was designated by the church a “called teacher,” or “commissioned minister,” 
but her duties as described were almost totally secular and identical to her earlier pre-title respon-
                                                                
62 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 46, at 1408–1409 (arguing that church labor relations are internal affairs 
and therefore  not subject to state intervention to protect employees from treatment that is “merely arbitrary or unfair”). 
63 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972). 
64 See, e.g., id. at 558–61 (reviewing the history of governmental noninterference with church matters).  See 
generally Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a choir director qualified as a “minister” for pur-
poses of the ministerial exception); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 
343 (5th Cir. 1999). 
65 Caroline Mala Corbin: Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidis-
crimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1973–81 (2007). 
66 Id. at 1979. 
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sibilities.67  Hosanna-Tabor allows a religious organization to theoretically escape scrutiny, let 
alone liability, for their employment decisions by simply giving appropriate labels to their work-
ers.  And under these theories, a court should not even inquire as to whether the label itself is ap-
propriate,68 eliminating virtually any level of oversight.69  While it might be appropriate under 
these Acts to allow religious schools to require all educators, even lay teachers, to share the same 
overall beliefs as their employers and presumably students,70 it seems incongruous that every lay 
teacher will also be denied protections under the law simply by virtue of being designated some-
thing more, without the actual corresponding duties. 
This leads to the question of whether these church activities are truly “private,” as the 
courts suggest, or themselves infringe on the public life of their employees.  Whether one works 
for a religious or secular entity, doing the same job should result in the same protections.  Does 
working for a religious entity, even in a primarily non-ministerial capacity, automatically elimi-
nate common legal protections available for everyone else?  The answer, especially after Hosan-
na-Tabor, appears to be yes, but the broader question is: should it? 
A. Misuse of Authority 
The courts have relied on both Freedom of Expression and the Establishment Clause71 to 
invalidate claims under employment discrimination.  It is argued that courts risk entanglement 
merely by questioning an employer’s decision about a ministerial employee,72 including apparent-
ly whether the employee’s duties actually constitute a ministerial role.  One court argued that it 
could not substitute its judgment for a church’s determination of “God’s appointed.”73  The falla-
cy of this argument is that the courts have decided they cannot even question a religious entity’s 
reasoning in determining who is “God’s appointed,” thereby leaving a vast vacuum of religious 
institution oversight for any reason, justified or not.  Although a “ministerial employee” is theo-
retically one who “helps shape and develop doctrine,”74 it is at least questionable that Cheryl 
Perich, although charged with leading prayers and teaching a religious class for approximately 
forty-five minutes out of the full school day,75 was in fact responsible for doing either; it is far 
more likely she followed religiously (pun intended) the curriculum and prayers chosen for her.76  
                                                                
67 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699-700 (2012). 
68 See Laycock, supra note 46, at 1412. 
69 See Corbin, supra note 65, at 1979 (expressing concerns that the Free Exercise Clause has been used to 
both protect religious entities from substantial burdens and safeguard them from any and all interference from the state). 
70 Although this article is not advocating it, it is conceivable that a lay teacher with no responsibilities of 
leading or even participating with students in prayer or other religious activities would serve perfectly well in a religious 
institution.  It is certainly the case in higher education, where of course the institutions are generally more open to diversi-
ty than they are on the lower levels. 
71 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
72 See Corbin, supra note 65, at 1980. 
73 Id. (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1170 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
74 Id. 
75 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. 
EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 107 (2011) (citing EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 
F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2010)). 
76 The Court apparently did find that Perich taught secular subjects “from a Christ-centered perspective,” 
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After Hosanna-Tabor it is debatable that any court will be able to determine whether an employee 
is in fact charged with these duties; religious institutions can prevent even the concern about law-
suits for employment discrimination by choosing appropriate titles for their employees, based on 
nothing but their own affirmation that the labels are appropriate.  One of the more questionable 
tenets of the ministerial exception from its inception is that the alleged discrimination does not 
need to be necessary for the religious institution’s work;77 the lower courts asserted (and the Court 
agreed in Hosanna-Tabor) that the Free Exercise Clause allows religious entities to decide for 
themselves what is appropriate, and whether and how it relates to religion, and that even ques-
tioning the institutions about such decisions would violate the Establishment Clause.78 
This court-driven analysis disregards Congress’s intent to protect citizens from the abus-
es of employers, one of the basic tenets of all of the non-discrimination Acts, including the ADA.  
By treating religious employers as a totally separate class, the courts have carved out an almost 
foolproof exception, allowing for hypothetically almost any scenario.  The wheelchair-bound pas-
tor would be required to be hired at Target, but not in his or her own field, regardless of the fact 
that preaching from a wheelchair would not likely hinder his or her abilities to be effective, and 
that this therefore is precisely the kind of discrimination Congress intended to prevent.  At the 
very least, requiring a showing of necessity for the discrimination, even for a ministerial employ-
ee, should be a given.  Although theoretically developed as a protection against forcing religious 
institutions to hire those who might not appropriately espouse their views, by being applied to vir-
tually any employee to whom the entity wishes it to apply, the Court has validated discrimination 
that has little or nothing to do with the original purposes of freedom of expression.  The generally 
appropriate recognition of church autonomy in all matters religious or spiritual has evolved into a 
virtual total limitation on (or elimination of) the state’s ability to protect employees of these insti-
tutions, with or without ties to the religious domain.79 
This interpretation is not necessarily related to Congress’s intent.  The original Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provided narrow statutory protections for religious entities, limited to the ina-
bility of an employee who was engaged in religious activities of his or her employer to sue for re-
ligious discrimination.80  Congress amended the Act in 1972, specifically rejecting language that 
would have exempted religious employers altogether from the requirements of Title VII, instead 
adopting language excluding religious institutions’ employees who “perform work connected with 
the carrying on . . . of its activities.”81 
                                                                
which made her ineligible under the ministerial exception to sue for employment discrimination under the ADA.  See 
Howard M. Wasserman, Essay, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/02-2012/Wasserman.pdf.  Without the abil-
ity to question how specifically this is true, for fear of violating the Establishment Clause, virtually any employee of an 
institution could be said to be doing his or her work “from the institution’s religious perspective.”  Under such analysis, a 
nurse, accountant or janitor who agrees to work for a religious entity could all be said to do their work from such a per-
spective, perhaps in practicality eliminating even the need for appropriate titles. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 289-90. 
79 Id. at 292. 
80 Joshua D. Dunlap, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Ex-
ception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2008 (2007) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 
241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2000))). 
81 Id. at 2008. 
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Although Congress held religious institutions to the dictates of the Civil Rights Act and 
declined to further broaden the protections available to religious institutions, the courts have been 
far more generous in doing so. 
The courts have carved out a couple of general requirements regarding first, what quali-
fies, as an exempted institution, and second, who is a ministerial employee.82  Under the first, any 
entity that is controlled by or financed by a religious organization, acts as an instrument of a 
church, or fulfills some religious activity, can qualify.83  As to the second, the employee must ful-
fill a spiritual or religious function—in theory, at least, his or her primary duties should be in fur-
therance of the institution’s religious work, although not necessarily as clergy.84  Much of the 
problem with this reasoning, however, is that the courts are reluctant to delve into the institution’s 
determination that the employee is in fact “important” to its spiritual functions, lest it unconstitu-
tionally entangle itself in violation of the Establishment Clause.85  Under this circular analysis, the 
institution is virtually free to assert an employee is barred from protections under the employment 
acts simply because they say so, without having to offer more than the most minimal proof of 
their assertions. 
And although the courts have apparently put their confidence in the institutions’ good 
faith in dealing with their employees, that is a questionable philosophy at best, exemplified by the 
cases that have gone before. 
In limiting inquiry about a ‘ministerial’ position, the courts have drafted great protections 
for the institution rather than the employee, using both the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses as rationale for their limited inquiries.  The Fifth Circuit found it could not discern 
whether an employment decision concerning a ministerial employee was valid without inserting 
itself into the inner management of the institution.86  Other courts have held that even requiring a 
religious institution to give a religious rationale for a facially discriminatory employment deci-
sion would be an unconstitutional interference with religion;87 yet such a non-discriminatory basis 
for an employment decision is at the heart of the non-discrimination statutes.  The Seventh Circuit 
found that allowing any questioning of a church’s employment decisions would “‘enmesh the 
court in endless inquiries as to whether each discriminatory act was based in Church doctrine or 
simply secular animus.’”88  Such a statement makes clear the court’s collective reasoning in ap-
plying the ministerial exemption: it is better to err on the side of free expression and non-
entanglement even if leaving an employee at the mercy of “secular animus.”  When a Catholic 
University decided to change the position of the President of the University, which was filled by 
                                                                
82 See id. at 2010-11. 
83 Id. at 2011. 
84 Id. at 2011-12. 
85 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 46, at 1376-77. (citing EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Semi-
nary, 485 F.Supp. 255, 261 (N.D. Tex. 1980), rev’d in part, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Enforcement of Title VII 
claims against a seminary . . . even in the absence of articulated doctrinal compulsion, will lead inevitably to excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion . . . .”). 
86 See Dunlap, supra note 80, at 2009 (citing Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Meth-
odist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
87 See id. (citing Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 
1102 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
88 See id. (citing Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis add-
ed)). 
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its first female occupant, the court disallowed her Title VII gender discrimination claims under 
the rationale that the board could discriminate against her due to the religious connections to her 
position, but let stand her breach of contract claim, finding no religious connection.89  Tellingly, 
the court was far more concerned with its own possible intrusion into church affairs than it was 
with whether there was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action. 
Although Congress was clear in its rejection of language excluding religious entities 
from Title VII, the courts have nevertheless read into Congress’s intent just such an application.  
The McClure court specifically held that “Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific word-
ing of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between 
church and minister.”90  The McClure court set the tone for not merely limiting inquiry into 
church employment decisions but virtually eliminating it altogether, a policy followed by all the 
circuits up to and through Hosanna-Tabor, but most prominently expressed in Rayburn.91 
The Rayburn court found that a female applicant for a pastoral position could not sue for 
gender or race discrimination, solidifying the ministerial exception.92  The court founded its deci-
sion on both Free Expression and the Establishment Clauses, finding that the church was free 
from state influence to make its ecclesiastical choices and that merely applying the relevant feder-
al statutes to those decisions would entangle the state in church affairs.93  The court further ad-
dressed the balancing concerns under the Free Expression Clause, finding that “. . .while ‘an un-
fettered church choice may create minimal infidelity to the objectives of Title VII, it provides 
maximum protection of the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religious beliefs,’”94 and 
held that the mere questioning of the church’s decision would illegally entangle the court with the 
church.95  Flowing from McClure and Rayburn, the courts have made clear that the purpose of the 
exception is transparent: once the defendant is found to fit the role of a ministerial employee, the 
exception will then prohibit even the possibility of judicial intervention in determining either the 
existence or the validity of any nondiscriminatory rationale.96 
Beginning with these cases, flowing through every circuit, and culminating with Hosan-
na-Tabor, the courts have been consistent in their appraisal that employment discrimination 
claims will not survive scrutiny under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.  The church 
may designate whomever it wishes as ‘ministerial’ with the barest of standards to be met, and the 
courts will not then challenge its right to discriminate against them, even in areas totally unrelated 
to ministry.97 
                                                                
89 See id. at 2014 (citing to Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307-10 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
90 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institu-
tions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 125 (2009) (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 
560-61 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
91 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1172 (4th Cir. 1985). 
92 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 90, at 126. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 128. 
97 See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that once petitioners meet 
the ministerial definition, they are not protected by federal law including wage and hour disputes of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, finding that ministers may resemble business employees but for purposes of these Acts are not synonymous with 
them). 
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III. EXCEPTION, NOT EXEMPTION 
The confusion generated by the niche carved out by the courts to the antidiscrimination 
statutes is evidenced even in the different names assigned it: some refer to the ministerial excep-
tion, while others call it the exemption.  But these are not truly synonymous, and their overlap is 
symptomatic of the problems with the policy itself.  An exception is adverse to the general rule, 
but not necessarily an absolute; it must be shown to apply.98  An exemption, on the other hand, is 
an unconditional immunity from action.99  While the courts, and more specifically Congress, theo-
retically carved out an exception to the general rules of employment discrimination law, subject to 
examination and analysis case-by-case,100 it has come to be regarded as an exemption, or bar, to 
such scrutiny.101  And therein lies a major problem with the policy. 
Even those who extoll the virtues of the exemption—religious freedom, separation of 
church and state—presume it to be applied in a reasonable manner, designed to protect religious 
communities from impermissible interference from the state.102  But they also acknowledge that 
its application may well bar legitimate lawsuits for discrimination—and that is a legitimate result 
for them.103  The rationale is that the courts must choose between protecting citizens from dis-
crimination or protecting the separation of church and state, and this exception solidifies that 
choice.104 
Perhaps, if the definition of “ministerial” had not been seriously diluted over the years, 
this would be a more valid argument.  But the fact is that many courts, culminating with the Su-
preme Court, have eliminated almost wholly the need for the religious institution to prove the 
main component of the exception—that the employee is, indeed, in a ministerial position.  Mov-
ing from a “primary duties” test105 to the far more ambiguous ‘‘important to the church’s func-
tions”106 analysis, and making clear along the way that courts will not delve into the meaning of 
either,107 the courts have turned what started out as a legitimate compromise between religious 
institutions and their workers into a one-sided, inflexible repudiation of Congress’ intent and 
workers’ rights.108  The courts have made the decision to accept the word of the defendant em-
                                                                
98 Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/exception?s=t (defining exception). 
99 Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/exempt?s=t (defining exempt). 
100 See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
101 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1170-72 (4th Cir. 1985) (using 
far more specific and absolute language). 
102 See Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 175-76 (2011). 
103 See id. at 176. 
104 See id. 
105 See Edward G. Phillips, Ministerial Exception Meets Its Match: Primary Duties of Secular Employees, 
TENN. B.J., Oct. 2010, at 32, 33 (explaining that the “primary duties” test removes individuals like administrative staff, 
custodians, and athletic coaches from the ministerial exception because they are not critical to the church’s spiritual mis-
sion). 
106 See The Ministerial Exception to Title VII, supra note 22, at 1778-79 (describing the broadening of the 
“primary duties” test to include individuals ranging from a press secretary to a choir director within the ministerial excep-
tion). 
107 See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985). 
108 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 90, at 128. The authors contend that once the court has made the determi-
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ployers regarding facially discriminatory actions with virtually no investigation or challenge as to 
whether their actions are, in fact, merely pretext to unlawful discrimination.109 
One commentator sums up probably the major concern regarding the exemption: it has 
next to nothing, and frequently literally nothing, to do with religion.110  The cases creating the ex-
emption are about non-religious issues: sex, age, disabilities.111  Tellingly, there are few, if any 
religious institutions defending their actions by claiming the right to discriminate based on their 
religion.112  And it would be difficult for them to do so—the Free Exercise clause, even if applied 
to entities rather than individuals, does not grant religions the right to discriminate against others; 
it merely grants the right to free expression of their own religious beliefs.113  But the courts have 
allowed religious employers an exception Congress did not—the right to be shielded for non-
religious impermissible behavior.114  Requiring a church to hire someone with a disability (or at 
least prove a non-discriminatory reason for not doing so) is not the same as ordering it to hire 
someone of a different faith—a clear religious ground.115  Applying non-discrimination laws in 
this manner would do nothing to encroach on the church’s religious freedom, but would merely 
hold it to the same standard as other employers on non-religious issues.116  There is little danger 
of the courts holding the Catholic or Orthodox Jewish faiths liable for not hiring women clergy, 
because the exclusion of women clergy is a part of their doctrinal beliefs.117  But it is difficult to 
reconcile the reasoning of the courts in declining to hold them liable for refusing to hire a disabled 
male clergy who is capable of performing the required tasks (even with the reasonable accommo-
dations required under the ADA).118  And this is exactly the likely result of holdings like Hosan-
na-Tabor and all that came before it.  Requiring a non-discriminatory reason for such actions 
from the church, even for a ministerial position, simply allows the employee to attack the validity 
of the reason; proving pretext on the part of the church does not intrude into the church’s religious 
functions.119 
The dilution of even the inquiry into whether an employee is a “minister” under the free 
expression clause leaves the court with little ability to oversee actual discriminatory practices by a 
religious institution.  In addition, courts have held that if an employee is somehow, even with the 
                                                                
nation that the employee fits into the “ministerial” definition—a fairly brief examination at this point—the exception liter-
ally cuts off all possibility of court analysis of the claims.  Id.  This includes assertions by the institutional defendant that it 
has not discriminated but rather has justifiable and permissible (religious-based) reasons for the treatment, which do not 
even have to be disclosed.  Id. 
109 See id. 
110 See Jane Rutherford, Equality As the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment 
Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1058 (1996). 
111 Id. at 1106-07. 
112 See id. at 1107. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. at 1108. 
117 See id. at 1108-09. 
118 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)(2009). 
119 See Rutherford, supra note 110, at 1108 (citing Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 
1043 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
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most minimal inquiry (so as not to violate the Freedom of Expression clause), found not to be in a 
ministerial position,120 the institution can then argue a violation of the Establishment Clause, cit-
ing impermissible entanglement of church and state by the court’s investigation of the non-
religious rationale for the alleged discrimination.121  A double-edged sword, indeed. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT NEVER LOOKED LIKE THIS 
There are concerns that the prevailing view, validated in Hosanna-Tabor, dismisses the 
true virtues of the Free Expression and Establishment Clause by combining permissible religious-
based discrimination, such as the requirement for male-only clergy of some religions, with the 
(theoretically, at least) non-permissible types of discrimination levied against ministerial employ-
ees.122  This gives religious institutions an ability to shield themselves from liability for discrimi-
natory practices that is not afforded to other employers.123  This does not merely recognize the 
Constitutional protections of separation of church and state, but elevates religious entities to a far 
higher ground than everyone else.124  One noted commentator opines that “[t]o say that religious 
liberty must encompass the right to harm others is to turn the First Amendment on its head.”125 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, years of allowing religious institutions to “handle” their own sex 
abuse problems necessitated mass overhauls of criminal statutes only after scores of children were 
harmed by the inaction of the state.126 
In extending the ADA to religious institutions, one need not and should not compare 
child sexual abuse to employment or other types of discrimination.  The theory that status as a re-
ligious entity should release that entity from liability for otherwise legally impermissible acts ac-
tually runs counter to the concept of separation of church and state, and would mean that we 
would be granting the church the right to harm others.127  Release from liability permits religious 
institutions to claim immunity in areas not intended by our constitution or our legislature. 
                                                                
120 Some argue that even allowing the courts to determine whether the employee is, in fact, a minister within 
the church’s definition risks substituting the secular judgment of the court for the church’s view.  See The Ministerial Ex-
ception to Title VII, supra note 22, at 1777. 
121 See Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the 
Constitutional Ministerial Exception to Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481, 512 (2001). 
122 See Jessica R. Vartanian, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices by Religious Employers 
and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1049, 1049-50 (2009). 
123 See id. at 1050. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. (citing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 7 (2005)). 
Hamilton cites the sad and lengthy history of child sexual abuse by religious figures, often condoned by the religious insti-
tutions themselves, as reason for concern that we not elevate religion to such an exalted position that we fail to hold it ac-
countable for impermissible acts.  See David Gibson, Monsignor William Lynn Convicted in Landmark Catholic Sex 
Abuse Case, WASH. POST (June 22, 2012) http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/monsignor-william-lynn-
convicted-in-landmark-catholic-sex-abuse-case/2012/06/22/gJQAIcJsvV_story.html; Sharon Otterman & Ray Rivera, Ul-
tra-Orthodox Shun Their Own for Reporting Child Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/20 
12/05/10/nyregion/ultra-orthodox-jews-shun-their-own-for-reporting-child-sexual-abuse.html?pagewanted=all. 
126 See generally Act of May 3, 2002, ch. 107, 2002 Mass. Acts, available at http://www.malegislature.gov 
/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2002/Chapter107 (requiring certain religious officials to report abuse of children). 
127 Vartanian, supra note 122, at 1050. 
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For example, the Catholic Church and other religious entities opposed to the individual 
mandate of the Affordable Care Act are waging a major battle in protest of the Act’s requirement 
that all employers provide contraception coverage under the Affordable Care Act.128  The church-
es claim the law impinges on their ability to function within their own religious doctrines, even 
after a compromise agreement that would have insurance companies paying for the disputed 
care.129 
In a case similar to Hosanna-Tabor, a church fired a lay teacher in a Catholic school af-
ter she admitted to undergoing in vitro fertilization.130  The Church maintains its position that its 
employees must follow the tenets of the Church even if they are not religious teachers.131  The 
case will be a test of how far courts will extend Hosanna-Tabor.  It could mean an extension be-
yond religious employees, since the teacher has never taught or had any interrelation with religion 
at the school.132 
In the aforementioned case, if the court were to apply ministerial exception doctrine to 
the Church, it would be an enormous expansion of what “ministerial” actually means.  It would 
also lead to concerns – in addition to the concerns raised by the contraception debate of the Af-
fordable Care Act – about whether and how religious employers can demand their employees ob-
serve the faith in their personal lives, including instructing them on the medical care and treat-
ment they may receive. 
As one commentator noted, it is unlikely the courts are shielding religious entities from 
liability for discrimination because they do not care if churches discriminate; instead, courts may 
think they must shield them from liability under the First Amendment.133  The ministerial exemp-
tion grew out of an exception to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permitting religious or-
ganizations to discriminate on the basis of religion (i.e. no female Catholic priests), but not for 
other protected attributes: race, sex, national origin.134  The Fifth Circuit in McClure extended the 
ministerial exception, without explanation, to a church minister allegedly discriminated against by 
the church on the basis of her sex, and reasoned that the church’s actions were fundamentally and 
inextricably tied to its ecclesiastical functions.135 
Some defenders of the exception point to the difficulty for courts to separate ministerial 
from non-ministerial duties for persons such as lay teachers who teach standard materials but also 
lead a class in prayer.136  Some courts use a religious historical analysis that cites the church’s 
                                                                
128 See, e.g., Melinda Henneberger, Obama Ruling Requires Catholic Institutions to Violate Church Teach-
ing, WASH. POST (Feb, 2, 2012, 7:57 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/post/obamas-health-care 
-mandate-on-birth-control-is-alienating-catholics/2012/02/02/gIQA0k0WlQ_blog.html. 
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evolution of two spheres of authority, spiritual and secular; some courts compare the religious his-
torical analysis to the church’s functions today to determine that religious institutions are entitled 
to decide all matters of church governance, faith and doctrine.137 
The problem with the historical analysis approach is that it directly contradicts the very 
concept of separation of church and state embodied in the First Amendment.  If the state simply 
accedes to all actions of the church, it is not asserting its own actions nor protecting its citizens 
from possible abuses, it is simply accepting the church’s assertions as evidence of non-abuse.  
The current application of the ministerial exception provides for minimal inquiry at best into 
whether the employee is in a covered ministerial position, and virtually none as to whether the 
church’s rationale for discrimination is pretextual. 
A unanimous Court in Hosanna-Tabor accepted that a “called” teacher instructs secular 
subjects from a “Christ-centered perspective,” making her a ministerial employee and barring her 
from action under the ADA.138  As in earlier cases, the question in Hosanna-Tabor rested on who 
exactly is a minister: is it someone who is directly involved in formulating and/or promoting 
church policy, or is it someone on the very fringes of such actions, such as the lay teacher who 
may lead a class in prayer or teach an occasional religion course?139  The Court here recognized 
both the exemption and the right of the church to define for itself its employees, while declining 
to find a bright line in categorizing a “minister,” thus leaving it for further debate.140  This of 
course further exacerbates the concerns with the exception, including that the courts will not even 
attempt to determine if religious entities are engaging in impermissible, non-religious based dis-
crimination.  Hosanna-Tabor does not explain away the unease over the ministerial exception, it 
merely affirms its existence and leaves thousands of workers further susceptible to pretextual and 
thus impermissible discrimination.  One had hoped at the very least the Court would have either 
demanded a modicum of transparency in apparent church discrimination, or at least explained bet-
ter why it should not.  These too, are unfortunately left to another day – or perhaps another 
source.  In 1999, the Court revised the ADA in another area, holding that its protections did not 
apply to those whose disabilities had been mitigated by medications or other devices.141  Much 
criticism and confusion ensued,142 causing Congress to finally address the issue in an amendment 
to the Act clarifying its original intent.143  Time, and perhaps political accountability, will tell if 
the same will occur in this instance. 
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